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Long-run patterns in market efficiency and the genesis of the market economy: Markets around the Mediterranean from Nebuchadnezzar to Napoleon (580 BC and 1800AD)
Földvári, Péter; van Leeuwen, Bas; Zanden, Jan Luiten Van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
market performance. In this paper we present a model to study the factors determining the price volatility of markets of … 2000 years. We find a break in market performance: medieval markets had a much lower level of volatility than ancient …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246614
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Mobile Phone Coverage and Producer Markets: Evidence from West Africa
Aker, Jenny; Fafchamps, Marcel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
within sub-Saharan Africa. The existing evidence suggests that information technology has improved market efficiency and …. Using market-level data we estimate the impact of mobile phone coverage on producer prices in Niger. We find that mobile … here helps understand how mobile phone coverage affects agricultural market efficiency in developing countries. It suggests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083580
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Market Structure and Market Performance in E-Commerce
Hackl, Franz; Kummer, Michael E; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We investigate the causal effect of market structure on market performance in the consumer electronics. We combine data … number of firms in the market based on the shops' entry decisions on other product markets in the past. We find that … instrumenting is particularly important for estimating the effect of competition on the markup of the price leader. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083898
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Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662235
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Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment
Kugler, Maurice; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We analyse an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations compete on criminal activities and engage in corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788890
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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
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Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229
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Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers
Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant deterrence effects before leniency programs were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136460
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Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ‘cheat’ on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696
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Does Terrorism Work?
Gould, Eric D; Klor, Esteban F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper examines whether terrorism is an effective tool to achieve political goals. By exploiting variation in … response to terror. Hence, terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shifting the entire Israeli political … landscape to the left. These findings may shed light on the causes underlying the spread of global terrorism in the last few …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458294