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Voucher Privatization, Corporate Control and the Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the Czech Privatization Programme
Marcincin, Anton; van Wijnbergen, Sweder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995
Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123768
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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland
Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379
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Corporate Governance Externalities
Acharya, Viral V; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
. The effect is stronger the greater the competition for managers and the stronger the managerial bargaining power. While …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136630
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Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks
Grossman, Richard; Imai, Masami - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals—that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145404
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841