Showing 1 - 10 of 317
We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305
This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276379
Politicians frequently undertake projects whose budgetary costs are disproportionate to the benefits they create for … wasteful spending may be a by-product of the accountability of politicians to their voters, not a symptom of its weakness or … diligence exceed the expected costs of waste. We introduce mechanisms of value-for-money auditing and show how politicians and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468681
This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612
We examine the theoretical rationale for the simultaneous granting of temporary Special and Differential (S&D) treatment to developing countries - both in ite protection and market-access components - under the WTO agreements. S&D rules constitute the centrepiece of the WTO’s strategy for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136465
This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136516
A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136628
whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient …) resource booms, however, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067503
Whereas a political budget cycle was once thought to be a phenomenon of less-developed economies, some recent studies find such a cycle in a large cross-section of both developed and developing countries. We find that this result is driven by the experience of ‘new democracies’, where fiscal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067554
In this paper we study the political issues associated with reform in the European labour market. We first discuss the role played by labour market rigidities in European society, and argue that reform is a difficult task because many regulations and rigidities benefit the majority of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497719