We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

This paper considers fiscal policy coordination in a European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We use an overlapping generations model which leads to departures from Barro-Ricardian neutrality. In our calibrated model, however, we find these departures to be rather small. Two models are...

We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with...

We consider independent monetary policy committees as a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing the stabilization role of monetary policy. If central banker's types are unknown, then for a wide range of parameters an independent monetary policy committee...

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments...