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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504682

Gender and Competition

Booth, Alison L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

In almost all European Union countries, the gender wage gap is increasing across the wages distribution. In this lecture I briefly survey some recent studies aiming to explain why apparently identical women and men receive such different returns and focus especially on those incorporating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082540

On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout

Klor, Esteban F; Winter, Eyal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831

No Trade

Carrillo, Juan D; Palfrey, Thomas R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We investigate, in a simple bilateral bargaining environment, the extent to which asymmetric information can induce individuals to engage in exchange where trade is not mutually profitable. We first establish a no-trade theorem for this environment. A laboratory experiment is conducted, where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661979

Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Gardner, Roy J; Keser, Claudia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

bottom-up budget process. We show, using structurally induced equilibrium theory, that this need not be the case. To test the … implications for budget processes of structurally induced equilibrium theory, we conduct a series of experiments. The evidence from … these experiments supports the predictions of structurally induced equilibrium theory, both at the aggregate and at the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662099

Stock Market Quality in the Prescence of a Traded Option

de Jong, Cyriel; Koedijk, Kees; Schnitzlein, Charles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We use a controlled economic experiment to examine the implications of asymmetric information for informational linkages between a stock market and a traded call option on that stock. The setting is based on the Kyle model and Back (1993). We find that an insider trades aggressively in both the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789115

Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution

Klor, Esteban F; Shayo, Moses - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment highlights the trade-off between social identity concerns and maximization of monetary payoffs. Subjects belonging to two distinct natural groups are randomly assigned gross incomes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114256

Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement

Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge … choice of performance measures and incentives depends on the agent’s knowledge, environmental risk, technological uncertainty …, and job complexity. The theory leads to several novel predictions, as well as new explanations for existing empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Postlewaite, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504519

Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504583

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