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Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Changes in Equity Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm

Lins, Karl; McConnell, John J.; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We study the stock price response to announcements of share purchases by corporate insiders over the period 1994 through 1999. The cross-sectional variability in the response is consistent with a curvilinear relation between firm value and insider ownership, where the value of the firm first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123861

Worker Matching and Firm Value

Moen, Espen R; Yashiv, Eran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper studies the hiring and firing decisions of firms and their effects on firm value. This is done in an environment where the productivity of workers depends on how well they match with their co-workers and the firm acts as a coordinating device. Match quality derives from a production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083331

On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan

Giannetti, Mariassunta; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014571

Weddings with Uncertain Prospects - Mergers under Asymmetric Information

Borek, Thomas; Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

the respective mono-tonicity properties. If the profit differential between post-merger and pre-merger profits satisfies … equilibria of merger games with simultaneous and sequential moves. The application of our framework to specific oligopoly models … illustrates that the introduction of two-sided asymmetric information may lead to considerable changes in the predicted merger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788984

The Toehold Puzzle

Betton, Sandra; Eckbo, B Espen; Thorburn, Karin S - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The substantial control premium in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) prior to launching a bid. Nevertheless, with a sample exceeding ten thousand initial control bids for public targets, we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792041

To Merge or to License: Implications for Competition Policy

Faulí-Oller, Ramon; Sandonís, Joel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger, which has the intention of transferring a … of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In contrast, when only one instrument is feasible, be it fixed fees or royalties …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792457

How Strong Buyers Spur Upstream Innovation

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136445

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136493

Mergers as Auctions

Ivaldi, Marc; Motis, Jrissy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

structural approach to infer acquirers’ gains from merging by interpreting a merger as an auction. Using nonparametric methods …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656211