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The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136464

Political Conflict and Power-Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia

Mazzuca, Sebastián L; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

representation (PR), was the desire of the Conservative and Liberal parties to come up with a way of credibly dividing power to avoid … problem with majoritarian electoral institutions was that they did not allocate power in a way which matched the support of … with the rising support for socialism and the desire to divide power more broadly. Our findings shed new light on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114374

Towards a Legal Theory of Finance

Pistor, Katharina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its core. Here, power becomes salient. This helps explain why …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084310

Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078

How Should Control Theory be Used by a Time-Consistent Government?

Cohen, Daniel; Michel, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

It has been recognized that the optimal strategy of a government is generally time-inconsistent: optimality requires that the government take into account expectations effects in the formulation of its policy and to ignore these effects when applying the policy. In order to analyse the problem,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666548

Regulation Games

Gilbert, Richard; Newbery, David M G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988

We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk capital would be expropriated by a regulator concerned only with the short-run interests of consumers. There exist rate of return regulatory policies supporting efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792339

Price Stability as a Nash Equilibrium in Monetary Open-Economy Models

Benigno, Gianluca; Benigno, Pierpaolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

A two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition and price stickiness is considered. This work shows the conditions under which price stability can implement the flexible-price allocation as a Nash equilibrium. This is possible if and only if both countries maintain a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136428

The Sustainability of Optimal Cooperative Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country World

Currie, David; Levine, Paul L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1986

The paper investigates the sustainability of cooperative rules for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in a two-country world. The problem is set out as a supergame in which the threat strategy is to switch to a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. A number of possible non-cooperative equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281334

Ramsey Monetary Policy and International Relative Prices

Faia, Ester; Monacelli, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We analyse welfare-maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic general equilibrium two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114306

Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries

Peralta, Susana; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656387