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Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model
Angeletos, George-Marios; Kollintzas, Tryphon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth … economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external … rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114275
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Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969
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A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788985
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Industrial and Trade Policies for the Emerging Market Economies
Audretsch, David B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994
The purpose of this paper is to suggest how institutions can be created and modified to devise and implement industrial policy in the emerging market economies. Two main issues confronting industrial policy institutions are how to avoid regulatory capture, that is, having those policy-makers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791806
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On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control
Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
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Does Finance Benefit Society?
Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
Academics' view of the benefits of finance vastly exceeds societal perception. This dissonance is at least partly explained by an under-appreciation by academia of how, without proper rules, finance can easily degenerate into a rent-seeking activity. I outline what finance academics can do, from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145481
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Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions
Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don’t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666705
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Who is the Enemy?
Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251
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The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-seeking Societies
Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
This paper analyses how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented. Political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124016
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Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?
Guidolin, Massimo; La Ferrara, Eliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper studies the relationship between civil war and private investment in a poor, resource abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining firms and conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conflict, marked by the death of the rebel movement leader...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067422