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Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
Under symmetric information, a job protection law that says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ them tomorrow can only reduce the two parties’ total surplus. The law restricts the principal’s possibilities to maximize their profit, which equals the total surplus,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656330
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Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation
Bartelsman, Eric J; de Wind, Joris; Gautier, Pieter A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
productivity and a risky technology with productivity subject to sizeable shocks. Strict EPL makes the risky technology relatively … less attractive because it is more costly to shed workers upon receiving a low productivity draw. We calibrate the model … mechanism can explain a considerable portion of the slowdown in productivity in the EU relative to the US since 1995. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468571
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The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass
Blanchard, Olivier J; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the 'first best', unemployment insurance comes with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124047
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Cross-Skill Redistribution and the Trade-Off Between Unemployment Benefits and Employment Protection
Boeri, Tito; Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio; Galasso, Vincenzo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against labour market risk. Different countries’ locations along this trade-off represent stable, hard to modify, politico-economic equilibria....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136508
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Protecting Against Labour Market Risk: Employment Protection or Unemployment Benefits?
Boeri, Tito; Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio; Galasso, Vincenzo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We document the presence of a trade-off between unemployment benefits (UB) and employment protection legislation (EPL) in the provision of insurance against labour market risk. The mix of quantity restrictions and price regulations adopted by the various countries would seem to correspond to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136672
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The Unemployment Implications of Mandatory Firing Costs
Booth, Alison L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994
The model developed in this paper examines the relationship between firing costs and unemployment in a simple two-period model with uncertainty. Where there are long-term employment relationships, and where risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms bargain over wages and firing costs, average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666736
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Does the Market Provide Sufficient Employment Protection?
Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper examines the role of employment protection when firms learn over time about the value of the match. When parties can commit to future wages, equilibrium contracts stipulate positive severance payments as an instrument to induce efficient lay-off decisions and there is no room for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789192
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Unemployment versus Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits
Marimon, Ramon; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
States in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality. To show this, we construct two fictitious economies … productivity grows less due to larger mismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788908
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231
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Housing market regulation and the social demand for job protection
Decreuse, Bruno; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
Controlling for country fixed effects, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of housing market regulation (HMR) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in OECD countries. We provide a model in which HMR increases foreclosure costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468671