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Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make … potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Stable Coalitions

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper examines recent theoretical developments in the theory of coalition stability. It focuses on the relationship between the incentives to defect from a coalition, the size of the resulting equilibrium coalition structure and the different assumptions on membership rules, coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791385

Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Protocol

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791506

Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen; Oreffice, Sonia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterizing an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123732

On the Consequences of the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo; Cersosimo, Igor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

first goal is to assess the impact of the US defection on the price of permits and compliance costs when technological … negotiations, its increased bargaining power and its eventual incentives to follow the US defections. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124246

Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations

Bosello, Francesco; Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses the relationship between different equity rules and the incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement. A widespread conjecture suggests that a more equitable distribution of the burden of reducing emissions would enhance the incentives for more countries – particularly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136584

Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

policies. This policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the freedom to sign agreements and deals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114398

Uncertainty and Trade Agreements

Limão, Nuno; Maggi, Giovanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

-policy uncertainty, in addition to the more standard gains from reducing the mean levels of trade barriers. We show that in a standard …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084554

Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo; Cersosimo, Igor; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries’ relative bargaining power …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661540

Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661962