Lobbying activities bias the political decision-making process. There tend to be deviations from the socially-optimal solutions. This paper shows that in an international context, this bias is not necessarily harmful in terms of economic welfare. It may correct externalities that occur in an...

Does international tax competition in the environmental field lead to undesirably low levels of environmental regulation and to unacceptable standards of environmental quality? The paper attempts to answer this question in a non-competitive partial-equilibrium framework. There is one firm that...

It has been argued in the literature that interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple tax-competition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the...

International trade and environmental regulation are interdependent. Central and East European Countries (CEECs) are now being integrated in international markets, and the question arises how environmental issues should be taken account of during this process and which institutional framework is...