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Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

Chemla, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper analyses the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive … to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that tougher competition … decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the upstream firm's negotiation position. In particular, the upstream …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497922

Who Integrates?

Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We examine vertical backward integration in oligopoly. Analysing a standard linear Cournot model, we find that for wide parameter ranges (i) some firms integrate, while others remain separated, and (ii) efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. Adopting a reduced-form approach, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504590

The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

Grossman, Sanford J; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1985

complete contracts. We define the firm as being composed of its assets. We present a theory of costly contracts which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497709

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm’s marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498007

Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications

Bourreau, Marc; Hombert, Johan; Pouyet, Jérôme; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In telecommunications some operators have deployed their own networks whereas some others have not. The latter firms must purchase wholesale products from the former to be able to compete on the final market. We show that, even when network operators compete in prices and offer perfectly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498041

Power in a Theory of the Firm

Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

contingent on them making the right investment; ii) ownership has adverse effects on the incentive to specialize. The theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498046

The Economics of Margin Squeeze

Jullien, Bruno; Rey, Patrick; Saavedra, Claudia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

The paper discusses economic theories of harm for anti-competitive margin squeeze by unregulated and regulated vertically integrated firms. We review both predation and foreclosure theories, as well as the mere exploitation of upstream market power. We show that foreclosure provides an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083910

Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Evidence from Trade Policy

Alfaro, Laura; Conconi, Paola; Fadinger, Harald; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

What is the relationship between product prices and vertical integration? While the literature has focused on how integration affects prices, this paper shows that prices can affect integration. Many theories in organizational economics and industrial organization posit that integration, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084043

Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization

Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

I provide a justification of intellectual property rights as a source of static efficiency gains in manufacturing, rather than dynamic benefits from greater innovation. I develop a property-rights model of a supply relationship with two dimensions of non- contractible investment. In equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084191

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

Muller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084198