During the recent financial crisis, central banks have provided liquidity and governments have set up rescue programmes to restore confidence and stability, often against the LLR principle advocated by Bagehot. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the...

On May 9, 2010 euro zone countries announced the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility as a response to the sovereign debt crisis. This paper investigates the impact of this announcement on bank share prices, bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads. The main private...

We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...

This Paper shows that bank closure policies suffer from a ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the...

We analyze public interventions to alleviate debt overhang among private firms when the government has limited information and limited resources. We compare the efficiency of buying equity, purchasing existing assets, and providing debt guarantees. With symmetric information, all the...

The recent crisis has shown that banks in distress can often expect to benefit from (implicit) government guarantees. This paper analyzes a panel of 781 banks from 90 countries to test whether the expectation of individual and systemic government support induces moral hazard. It shows that banks...

We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too...

We present a simple model of systemic risk and we show that each financial institution's contribution to systemic risk can be measured as its systemic expected shortfall (SES), i.e., its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized. SES increases with the...