constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

this separation interact with the regulation of the product market. The main issue to be addressed here is how the degree … concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of …

. The effect is stronger the greater the competition for managers and the stronger the managerial bargaining power. While …

We analyze corporate fraud in a model in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation … performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking external corporate governance and auditing regulation into account. For given …

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …