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Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration
Iossa, Elisabetta; Rey, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent’s productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083903
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Guru Dreams and Competition: An Anatomy of the Economics of Blogs
Dong, Yi; Massa, Massimo; Zhang, Hong - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
The rise of social media has encouraged guru dreams because of the low entry barrier and highly skewed distribution of public attention that characterize social media. The pursuit of guru status, however, may be achieved through information provision or cheap talk, and competition inherent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196033
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Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements
Acharya, Viral V; DeMarzo, Peter; Kremer, Ilan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364996
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Laws and Norms
Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals’ behaviors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371470
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Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets
Armour, John; Mayer, Colin; Polo, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
reputation and regulatory policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682887
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Reputation and Entry in Procurement
Butler, Jeff; Carbone, Enrica; Conzo, Pierluigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement game with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083951
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Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and … pessimistic about future monetary policy and uncertainty gradually rises. Reputation determines the speed with which agents … found to benefit from strong reputation and large flexibility in responding to inflationary shocks. Increasing transparency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084074
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Information Management in Banking Crises
Shapiro, Joel; Skeie, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084160
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Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance
Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank’s failure may undermine confidence in the banking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084273
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Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084462