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Dittmar, Amy; Mahrt-Smith, Jan; Servaes, Henri - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Agency problems are an important determinant of corporate liquidity. For a sample of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries, we find that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in countries with good shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498063

Political Economics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multidimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms …: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these … comparative politics, as we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions: we model some stylized features of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067583

Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility

Lahiri, Sajal; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility. A donor country gives aid to a recipient government for the benefit of a target group. However, the recipient government accepts political contributions from a lobby group not targeted by the donor and transfers a fraction of the aid to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667087

Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms

Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Delegated Activism and Disclosure

Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841

Large powerful shareholders and cash holding

Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the relationship between liquid asset holding and the pattern of share ownership and control structures within the firm. We explore these issues using a data set of Belgian firms that is particularly well suited to studying the institutions of control oriented finance. The data include...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041096

Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?

Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207

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