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Effective Political Contests
Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307
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Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366
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All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545
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All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality
Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454
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Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions
Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485
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Optimal Rewards in Contests
Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501
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Contests with Ties
Cohen, Daniel; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524
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The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly
Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136493
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Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's
Ashenfelter, Orley C; Graddy, Kathryn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
The Sotheby’s/Christie’s price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067602
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What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514