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Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement
White, Lucy; Williams, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative …' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts … bargaining model which incorporates the idea that agreements may be enforced non-cooperatively. We show that this has a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662212
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Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to test whether this fundamental trade-off is actually relevant. In … particular, we investigate settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures. We find that theory is indeed a … useful predictor for the relative magnitudes of the principals' offers, the agents' information gathering decisions, and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080
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Network Structure and Strategic Investments: An Experimental Analysis
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
This paper analyzes the effects of network positions and individual risk attitudes on individuals' strategic decisions in an experiment where actions are strategic substitutes. The game theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). In particular, we are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136539
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Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, the question has to be answered empirically. As a first step in that direction, we have conducted a laboratory experiment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067500
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Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … explained by social preferences. Investigating settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures, we find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433
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The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
Crawford, Gregory S; Yurukoglu, Ali - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
, pricing, bundling, and input market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001064
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The Politics of Compromise
Bonatti, Alessandro; Rantakari, Heikki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083881
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Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders
Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134
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Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium
Drugov, Mikhail - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper studies a dynamic bargaining model with informational externalities between bargaining pairs. Two principals … information and correlated between them. The principals benchmark their agents against each other by making the same offers in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083946