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Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become … increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder protection depriving incumbent CEOs of activists’ support. This finding … to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504332

The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China

Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liao, Guanmin; Yu, Xiaoyun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firms in emerging markets. To establish causality, we use a unique dataset from China and exploit that at different times, Chinese provinces introduced policies to attract highly talented emigrants. These policies led to an exogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084604

Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms

Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

conditioning pay on long- versus short-term performance and characterize a second-best optimal compensation scheme. The paper shows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Delegated Activism and Disclosure

Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841

Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105

Globalization and the 'New Enterprise'

Marin, Dalia; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Globalization has been identified by many experts as a new way firms organize their activities. This Paper surveys recent work that examines the role of trade integration between similar and dissimilar countries for these changes in corporate organization. It is shown that international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662173

Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central European Enterprises

Grosfeld, Irena; Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper interprets the existing evidence on enterprise restructuring in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Despite differences in restructuring policies, the pattern of observed restructuring appears similar in the three countries. Contrary to initial expectations, managers of SOEs have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662184

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Executive Compensation and Stock Options: An Inconvenient Truth

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We reexamine the issue of executive compensation within a general equilibrium production context. Intertemporal optimality places strong restrictions on the form of a representative manager's compensation contract, restrictions that appear to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666708

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