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Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening
Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534
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On the Structure of Tenancy Contracts: Theory and Evidence from 19th Century Rural Sicily
Bandiera, Oriana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
-contractible maintenance investment. Since, however, incentive provision is costly, long-term contracts will be employed only when, due to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124010
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Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Consider a seller and a buyer who write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458298
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The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments
Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in general training when labour markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in specific training...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666647
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Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?
Felli, Leonardo; Roberts, Kevin W S - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
equilibria with coordination failures. Different types of inefficiency arise when sellers undertake investment before market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136606
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Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067500
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Hold-Up Problems and Firm Formation
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
partnership in which they have invested, bear the costs yet forego the benefits of the investment, join another partnership …, invest there anew, and appropriate the surplus created by the new investment. To capture the idea we introduce the notion of … reinvestment-proof equilibria in which no agent has an incentive to reinvest or to change his investment in the current firm. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498121
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How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Siebert, Ralph; von Graevenitz, Georg - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
This paper is a study of licensing in a patent thicket. In a patent thicket licensing allows firms to avoid hold-up. It will have different effects on firms' R&D incentives depending on whether firms license existing or future patents. Building on a model of a patent portfolio race, firms'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504462
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Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
In a complete contracting model, a risk-neutral seller exerts effort while producing a good. Effort is a hidden action and stochastically influences the risk-neutral buyer's valuation. Then the buyer can gather private information about his valuation. The ex ante optimal contract may encourage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656200
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Investments as Signals of Outside Options
Goldlücke, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is … information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009001060