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Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations
Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
clauses would reduce such excessive, signaling-driven investment and patenting intensity. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508
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Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital
Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976792
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Financial Contracting Theory Meets The Real World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts
Kaplan, Steven; Strömberg, Per Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
We compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory, by studying actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. (1) The distinguishing characteristic of VC financing is that they allow VCs to separately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123862
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Start-ups, Venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax
Keuschnigg, Christian; Nielsen, Soren Bo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack their own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124109
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Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms
Gebhardt, Georg; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
When a young entrepreneurial firm matures, it is often necessary to replace the founding entrepreneur by a professional manager. This replacement decision can be affected by the private benefits of control enjoyed by the entrepreneur which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124147
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Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt
Cornelli, Francesca; Yosha, Oved - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
Venture capital financing is characterized by extensive use of convertible debt and stage financing. The paper shows why convertible debt is better than a simple mixture of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124200
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Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
Kaplan, Steven; Strömberg, Per Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the … attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124437
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Venture Capital and Industrial ''Innovation''
Hirukawa, Masayuki; Ueda, Masako - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
measure of innovation alternative to patent count. Unlike the impact on patent count, we do not find that VC investment … affects total factor productivity growth. We do find that VC investment is positively associated with labor productivity but … and material. Therefore, our finding suggests that, at industry level, VC investment increases the patent propensity but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136420
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Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?
Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. I argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain control in order to avoid undue interference. Hence, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136679
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Venture Capital Financing: The Role of Bargaining Power and the Evolution of Informational Asymmetry
Koskinen, Yrjö; Rebello, Michael; Wang, Jun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We model a situation where the entrepreneur has an informational advantage during the early stages of an investment … informational asymmetry affects venture investment and the nature of financing contracts under two different scenarios with regard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067345