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Almazan, Andres; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

compensation package (including severance pay) under governance structures that differ in the power that the incumbent CEO has on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123708

Social Networks in the Boardroom

Kramarz, Francis; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social networks may strongly affect board composition and (2) social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a unique dataset on executives and outside directors of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124038

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive … power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm’s length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power … instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Corporate Governance

Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666704

Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms

Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Delegated Activism and Disclosure

Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841

Large powerful shareholders and cash holding

Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

that these cross holdings facilitate an effective internal capital market. We find little evidence that managers have an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041096

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