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The Paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067541
by investigating factors determining the demand for hospitalization in Germany. While most previous studies have found a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791813
Standard insurance models predict that people with high (health) risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209831
We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468555
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60,000 adult individuals. The estimation strategy relies on the institutional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124425
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504294
This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083835
The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084045
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084241