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Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights

Miller, Marcus; Thomas, Dania - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What are the implications for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking capital gains and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067444

Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate

Donohue, John J; Wolfers, Justin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

purporting to show robust and precise estimates of a substantial deterrent effect of capital punishment. We assess the various …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504776

Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization

Palali, Ali; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We investigate the determinants of the support for cannabis legalization finding a causal effect of personal experience with cannabis use. Current and past cannabis users are more in favor of legalization. We relate this to self-interest and inside information about potential dangers of cannabis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083221

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Muller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the … prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed …; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083501

Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Acconcia, Antonio; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083808

Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis

Fabra, Natalia; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084067

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work

den Berg, Gerard J van; van der Klaauw, Bas; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661560