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Weddings with Uncertain Prospects - Mergers under Asymmetric Information

Borek, Thomas; Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

equilibria of merger games with simultaneous and sequential moves. The application of our framework to specific oligopoly models …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788984

Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition?

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Although naive intuition may indicate the opposite, the existing literature suggests that uncertainty about costs in the homogeneous-good Bertrand model intensifies competition: it lowers price and raises total surplus (but also makes profits go up). Those results, however, are derived under two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084520

Trading and information diffusion in OTC markets

Babus, Ana; Kondor, Péter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We model trading and information diffusion in OTC markets, when dealers can engage in many bilateral transactions at the same time. We show that information diffusion is effective, but not efficient. While each bilateral price partially reveals all dealers' private information after a single...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084704

Networks of Relations and Social Capital

Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions … and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable sub-networks inhibit more valuable larger … networks. The model provides formal definitions for individual and communities’ ‘social capital’ in the spirit of Coleman and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114333

Insisting on a Non-negative Price: Oligopoly, Uncertainty, Welfare and Multiple Equilibria

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656447

Are Markets More Competitive if Commodities are Closer Substitutes?

Schulz, Norbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

Equilibrium prices of the variants of a differentiated commodity are shown to increase if the variants become closer substitutes, under a set of circumstances, which is by no means pathological. Rather, the underlying argument has a bearing on market prices, whenever a potential buyer does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123586

Do Consumers Search for the Highest Price? Equilibrium and Monopolistic Optimum in Differentiated Products Markets

Schulz, Norbert; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

We develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price, in which the structure of search costs can be manipulated by the suppliers of these variants, e.g. by joining an existing market or opening a new one. We analyse the subgame perfect equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136540

Barter For Price Discrimination?

Guriev, Sergei; Kvassov, Dmitry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

Unprecendented growth of barter is a striking phenomenon of Russia's transition. The explanations of barter include tight monetary policy, tax evasion and poor financial intermediation. We show that the market power may also be important. We build a model of imperfect competition in which firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504640

The Generalized War of Attrition

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N+1 firms. Furthermore, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656154

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

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