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Can we Automate Earnings Forecasts and Beat Analysts?

Ball, Ryan; Ghysels, Eric; Zhou, Huan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Can we design statistical models to predict corporate earnings which either perform as well as, or even better than analysts? If we can, then we might consider automating the process, and notably apply it to small and international firms which typically have either sparse or no analyst coverage....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084355

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g. a division manager) gains evidence about earnings...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504644

Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504726

Ownership and Control of German Corporations

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore … is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the … holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits from control changes and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666867

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468606

The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

the subsequent 100 years, and comparing the pattern of ownership and control with a sample incorporated around 1960. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123634

Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124063

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Renneboog, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the US, where there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124256

Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements

Acharya, Viral V; DeMarzo, Peter; Kremer, Ilan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364996

On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listings

Fernandes, Nuno; Giannetti, Mariassunta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings, new listings, and delistings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we document a growing tendency of listings to concentrate in the U.S. and the U.K. and large changes in all exchanges’ ability to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991544