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Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
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Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care
Rud Kristensen, Søren; Siciliani, Luigi; Sutton, Matt - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084045
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Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance
Kaarboe, Oddvar Martin; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404
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Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers
Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661600
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Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)
Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
higher price under 'no commitment'. Nevertheless, quality and manipulation remain at lower levels, whereas auditing is more … commit to a given audit policy (commitment); b) the purchaser cannot commit to a given audit policy (no commitment). If … audit is higher under the 'commitment' scenario than under the 'no commitment' one; also, under 'commitment', the degree of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661727
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Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device
Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We explore the role of firms in insuring risk-averse workers. As a device that allows workers to commit to the delivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the spot market if workers are sufficiently risk averse and the firm can base incentive payments on good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043
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Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Mesnard, Alice - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We study how smugglers respond to different types of migration policies - legalisation through the sale of migration visas, or more traditional repressive policies through borders' enforcement, employers' sanctions or deportation - by changing the price they propose to illegal migrants. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083587
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Travel Demand Model with Heterogeneous Users and Endogenous Congestion: An application to optimal pricing of bus services
Batarce, Marco; Ivaldi, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have heterogeneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493565
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Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
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Third Party Monitoring and Golden Parachutes
Iossa, Elisabetta; Legros, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
inducing auditing and revelation of information from the auditor. Somewhat surprisingly, the first best can be attained in the … for efficiency in the second best situation. Rather, auditing by a potential entrant becomes necessary and a mix of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504381