This paper studies multi-agent optimal contracting with cost synergies. We model synergies as the extent to which … effort by one agent reduces his colleague's marginal cost of effort. An agent's pay and effort depend on the synergies he … exerts, the synergies his colleagues exert on him and, surprisingly, the synergies his colleagues exert on each other. It may …

This paper studies multi-agent optimal contracting with cost synergies. We model synergies as the extent to which … effort by one agent reduces his colleague's marginal cost of effort. An agent's pay and effort depend on the synergies he … exerts, the synergies his colleagues exert on him and, surprisingly, the synergies his colleagues exert on each other. It may …

synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model …

Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model …