We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player’s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining....

We analyse the interaction of asymmetric industries in international vertically related markets. Each downstream firm bargains efficiently with its domestic supplier in a first stage and with the foreign supplier in a second stage. The asymmetry in upstream costs leads to inter-industry trade....

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process –...

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on...

This paper proposes a model of boundedly rational choice that explains the well known attraction and compromise effects. Choices in our model are interpreted as a cooperative solution to a bargaining problem among an individual’s conflicting dual selves. We axiomatically characterize a unique...

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger...

By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone,...

We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules," to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules...

This paper evaluates the determination of receipts from EU budget by considering a richer institutional structure than in earlier studies. We assume that the member states have self-interested objectives in CM trying to minimize their contributions within the given framework of the EU budget...

This paper assesses the current distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers in terms of fairness. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, we define fairness in the European context and discuss the potential definitions of the European Union; a state, an association of states...