We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling...

Many collective decision problems have the common feature that individuals' desired outcomes are correlated but not identical. This Paper studies collective decisions with private information about these desired policies. Each agent holds private information that mainly concerns their own bliss...

In this article, we study Europe's monetary geography on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. Our unit of analysis is the city and we explore inter-city linkages. Important findings include a considerable degree of integration and multilateralism with monetary centers having already emerged as...

Dealers in over-the-counter securities form networks to mitigate search frictions. The audit trail for municipal bonds shows the dealer network has a core-periphery structure. Central dealers are more efficient at matching buyers and sellers than peripheral dealers, which shortens intermediation...

The political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way, namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses. We find that a...

This Paper studies a model of public policy with heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) is chosen directly by an elected policy-maker, and the other (pollution) depends stochastically on the amount of roads. Both a one-country and a two-country version of the model are...

In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. We start by analyzing patterns in public opinion on migration and find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open migration policies. Next...

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state...

We study political activism by several agents (lobbyists, unions, etc.) who have private but imperfect policy-relevant signals, and seek to influence the decisions of a policy maker. When agents can share information and coordinate their actions, the equilibrium is shown to be equivalent to that...

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the...