Showing 1 - 10 of 110
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002
This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667
In this Paper we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules, which nevertheless falls short of harmonization across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal culture, integration, and harmonization. It is argued...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661734
We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508
Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia initially developed to protect land from predatory attacks, at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common-agency model, the Paper shows that: (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662056
A monetary union is modelled as a technology that makes surprise devaluations impossible but requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy. It is shown that for low discount factors and sufficiently correlated shocks welfare in the union is higher than that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662125
We analyse the labour supply of 16-year-old British children together with the cash transfers made to them by their parents. We develop a theoretical model with an altruistic parent and a selfish child, which serves as a basis for the empirical specification in which labour supply and transfers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666826
In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubinstein-Ståhl bargainings between pairs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789066
This Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791506