The incentive to renege on a commitment to a fixed exchange rate is shown to be state contingent. A fixed exchange rate policy is not viable under `unusual' circumstances, and the incentive to violate the commitment is larger in the case of contractionary shocks than in the case of expansionary...

Aggregate stock prices, relative to virtually any indicator of fundamental value, soared to unprecedented levels in the 1990s. Even today, after the market declines since 2000, they remain well above historical norms. Why? We consider one particular explanation: a fall in macroeconomic risk, or...

Political risk is widely present in developing but also in developed countries, and stems from a variety of sources. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a theoretical model to investigate the impact of political risk on irreversible investment. Second, we apply our model to...

The EMS's robustness in the face of stochastic shocks is studied, using the Liverpool World Model and the optimal strategy algorithm of Brandsma and Hughes Hallett. The EMS began life in 1979 with a system design permitting regular parity changes; we find this design to be relatively unstable,...

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. With restricted attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and full depreciation we solve...

This Paper studies the internal commitment mechanisms or ‘personal rules’ (diets, exercise regimens, resolutions, moral or religious precepts, etc.) through which people seek to achieve self-control. Our theory is based on the idea of self-reputation over one’s willpower, which potentially...

The dynamic inconsistency of a government's preferred policy, when it occurs, usually implies that the maximum level of welfare that can be delivered at some initial time can only be attained by constraining the economy to `low' levels in the future. In this paper, we set up a linear quadratic...

How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different...

Behavioral economics presents a "paternalistic" rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only “distortion” is agents’ time inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and...

Following Kydland and Prescott's (1977) seminal paper on time-inconsistency, a large literature has explored possible frameworks within which monetary policy could overcome this problem -- neatly illustrated in Barro and Gordon's (1983) model. In a stochastic world there appears to be a...