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Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187

The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-seeking Societies

Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper analyses how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during … the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124016

Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites … and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labour … (e.g., competitive markets versus labour repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114453

So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems

Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305

Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes

Conconi, Paola; DeRemer, David; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276379

Rational Crowd-Pleasing and Democratic Accountability

Dewatripont, Mathias; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Politicians frequently undertake projects whose budgetary costs are disproportionate to the benefits they create for the voters or shareholders those decision-makers represent. When they are not the result of simple random mistakes, such wasteful projects are often attributed to weak mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468681

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612

The Economics of Special and Differential Trade Regimes

Conconi, Paola; Perroni, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine the theoretical rationale for the simultaneous granting of temporary Special and Differential (S&D) treatment to developing countries - both in ite protection and market-access components - under the WTO agreements. S&D rules constitute the centrepiece of the WTO’s strategy for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136465

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136516

Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement

Eliaz, Kfir; Ray, Debraj; Razin, Ronny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136628

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