Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 161
Cover Image
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
Cover Image
A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773
Cover Image
Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
if the permissible types of contracts are limited by regulation resembling the separation of investment and commercial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861
Cover Image
Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure
Aney, Madhav; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246601
Cover Image
A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644035
Cover Image
Insurance Search and Switching Behavior
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition. Although all insurers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466330
Cover Image
Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle
Reichlin, Pietro; Siconolfi, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
In an economy where entrepreneurs with unequal ‘abilities’ face alternative investment projects, which differ in their degree of risk and productivity, we analyse the Nash equilibrium contracts arising from a banks-borrowers game in the context of asymmetric information. We show that, for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666565
Cover Image
Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives
Acharya, Viral V; Johnson, Tim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
Insider trading in the credit derivatives market has become a significant concern for regulators and participants. This paper attempts to quantify the problem. Using news reflected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information, we report evidence of significant incremental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666591
Cover Image
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information
Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
The Paper studies a straightforward adverse selection problem in which an informative but imperfect signal on the agent’s type becomes public ex post. The agent is protected by limited liability, which rules out unboundedly high penalties. Analysing the consequences of the additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666621
Cover Image
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071