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Takeovers and the Dynamics of Information Flows
Chemla, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
relationships. We consider a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately-informed stakeholder, a buyer for example. In our … surplus from the buyer. The possibility of a takeover that leaves the buyer with a higher (lower) rent than the incumbent … manager increases (decreases) the buyer's willingness to reveal their valuation. We suggest a number of testable predictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662138
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The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments
Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in general training when labour markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in specific training...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666647
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Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful
Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We exploit an incentive change in professional soccer leagues aimed at encouraging more attacking and goal scoring to obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of the same teams in a competition that experienced no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114301
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Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching
Bhaskar, Venkataraman; Hopkins, Ed - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the …. Equilibrium investment is efficient when there is complete symmetry between the sexes. However, when there is any asymmetry … boys than for girls, girls will invest more than boys. If there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246608
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Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders
Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R; Turban, Sébastien - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084134
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Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement
White, Lucy; Williams, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662212
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Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes
White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player’s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666445
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On Sustainable Pay-As-You-Go Systems
Demange, Gabrielle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
An unfunded Social Security system faces a major risk, sometimes referred to as ‘political risk’. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each newborn generation. The analysis is conducted in an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666926
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Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints
Inderst, Roman; Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms that face capacity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661929
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Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest
Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the … buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871