International agreements increasingly constrain the ability of governments to use trade policies whereas few constraints apply to the use of investment policies. Using a model in which a local and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market, we analyse whether the foreign firm may be forced to...

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms...

International cooperation is generally driven by a desire to offset a negative spillover imposed by other countries or to help governments to overcome domestic political economy constraints that impede the adoption of welfare enhancing policy changes. In principle, both conditions are satisfied...

We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. We show that monetary fines are more...

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign firms or the acquisition of existing domestic firms. The preferences of a foreign firm and the host country government over these two modes of FDI are examined in the presence of costly technology transfer....

Motivated by discussions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, we develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a less-developed country (LDC) to offer increased market access (via a tariff reduction) in exchange for a...

Using a repeated game approach, this paper models a North-South trade agreement under which North offers South improved market access (via a tariff reduction) if South agrees to prevent local imitation by strengthening its protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). We show that such an...