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Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate

Donohue, John J; Wolfers, Justin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Does the death penalty save lives? A surge of recent interest in this question has yielded a series of papers purporting to show robust and precise estimates of a substantial deterrent effect of capital punishment. We assess the various approaches that have been used in this literature, testing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504776

Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization

Palali, Ali; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We investigate the determinants of the support for cannabis legalization finding a causal effect of personal experience with cannabis use. Current and past cannabis users are more in favor of legalization. We relate this to self-interest and inside information about potential dangers of cannabis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083221

Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

Muller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083501

Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Acconcia, Antonio; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083808

Antitrust Fines in Times of Crisis

Fabra, Natalia; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084067

Modelling Financial Incentives To Get Unemployed Back To Work

Boone, Jan; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job … benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067430

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; Ours, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498018

Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behaviour

Boone, Jan; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set …-up allows us to distinguish between the effects of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effects … that discourage the unemployed from risking benefit sanctions (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791743