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The Timing of Takeovers in Growing and Declining Markets

Mason, Robin; Weeds, Helen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Empirical studies have found that takeover activity is positively related to the absolute size of industry-level shocks. In this paper we develop a dynamic framework to analyze the timing of takeover which explains this pattern. Takeover may create value either by exploiting synergies or through...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468572

Approval Rules for Sequential Horizontal Mergers

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

stating safe harbour rules for merger approval. In the presence of sequential mergers, however, computation of the sufficient … emerging from the first. If the mergers are close enough in time, the second merger must be evaluated without the knowledge of …. It is shown that joint merger evaluations generate too many rejections of mergers and independent evaluations lead to too …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123590

Mergers for Market Power in a Cournot Setting and Merger Guidelines

Faulí-Oller, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

The US Merger Guidelines consider that the anticompetitive effect of a horizontal merger is increasing in the initial market concentration and decreasing in the elasticity of demand. These ideas are studied in a setting where identical firms compete a la Cournot and marginal cost is constant....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123723

The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Duso, Tomaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123810

Toeholds and Takeovers

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Huang, Ming; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ‘toehold’ bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136550

Expansion of Banking Scale and Scope: Don't Banks Know the Value of Focus

Boot, Arnoud W A; Milbourn, Todd; Thakor, Anjan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

not be too competitive, and could point to a benefit of merging insofar as mergers reduce competition and deepen the banks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136648

'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy

Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome features the following comparative static properties. The more similar firms are, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497960

Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295

To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question

Corchon, Luis; Faulí-Oller, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about the … parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We find that most of the standard tools in dominant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504319

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

Cornelli, Francesca; Li, David Daokui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and that he will tender a positive fraction of his shares)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504384