We study charitable giving within social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we establish three key relationships between social group size and fundraising outcomes: (i) a positive relationship between group size and the total number of donations; (ii) a negative relationship between group size...

We study competition between nonprofit providers supplying a collective service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. When providers adopt a not-for-profit mission, the absence of a residual claimant can impede entry, pro- tecting the position of an inefficient incumbent. Moreover,...

We describe a model of fundraising in social groups, where private information about quality of provision is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals engage in voluntary provision of a pure collective good that is consumed by both neighbors and non-neighbors. We show that, unlike in the case...

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other...

Fixed costs that are not sunk do not translate into entry barriers against for-profit competitors. We show that in the case of non-commercial, not- for-profit providers, the presence of fixed costs may protect the position of an inefficient incumbent. In these situations, successfully contesting...

We study contestability in non-profit markets where non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good or service through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit markets, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts between...

Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move toward fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This Paper argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy...

This paper examines a model of jurisdiction formation where individuals differ in both income and preferences, and where public provision choices within jurisdictions are the outcome of a political process, but can be supplemented by private contributions. Locational equilibria in this model can...

Evidence on the price elasticity of private donations to charities and on the crowding out effect of donations by government grants suggests that a redirection of government funds from tax incentives for giving towards direct grants could increase total charity funding. This raises the question...

Recent evidence suggests that individuals do not always take notice of tax attributes when making their choices. This paper focuses on the case of tax relief for charitable contributions. Although a fully rational donor should view a matched payment to the receiving charity and a tax rebate of...