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Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts markets, where the expert observes the intervention that a consumer needs to fix his problem and also provides a treatment, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480

Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies

Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

democracies. The incumbent can prevent credible challengers from running, organize vote fraud, or even physically eliminate the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084133

On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

yielding equilibria exhibiting various degrees of inefficiencies and fraud. The variety of results has fostered the impression …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194

The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from the Transition Economies

Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

During the transition from plan to market, managers and politicians succeeded in maintaining control of large parts of the stock of socialist physical capital. Despite the obvious importance of this phenomenon, there have been no efforts to model, measure and investigate this process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504218

Can Openness Deter Corruption? The Role of Foreign Direct Investment

Larrain B., Felipe; Tavares, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The economics literature provides ample evidence that higher corruption discourages FDI inflows. In this paper we … inflows on corruption. We present a simple model that illustrates the two-way relationship between foreign direct investment … and corruption, identifying exactly the direction of causality that we address: how do “exogenous“ variations in FDI …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504415

Legal Standards, Enforcement and Corruption

Immordino, Giovanni; Pagano, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self …-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a …-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistently with the model's predictions for benevolent governments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504469

How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504493

The Returns from Reducing Corruption: Evidence from Education in Uganda

Reinikka, Ritva; Svensson, Jakob - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

by inefficiencies and corruption. We examine this hypothesis by exploiting an unusual policy experiment: A newspaper …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504593

Learning Unethical Practices from a Co-worker: The Peer Effect of Jose Canseco

Gould, Eric D; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their co-workers, even if those skills are unethical. Specifically, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, one of the best baseball players in last few decades, affected the performance of his teammates. In his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498002

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010