We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. The...

Principal-agent models of moral hazard have been developed under the assumption that the principal knows the agent's risk-aversion. This Paper extends the moral hazard model to the case when the agent's risk-aversion is his private information, so that the model also exhibits adverse selection....

We construct a structural model of household decision-making and matching and estimate the returns to schooling within marriage. We consider agents with idiosyn- cratic preferences for marriage that may be correlated with education, and we allow the education levels of spouses to interact in...

There has been little empirical work evaluating the sensitivity of fertility to financial incentives at the household level. We put forward an identification strategy that relies on the fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among 'comparable' households. We...

Commentators have often linked the increase in births in France since 1995 to more generous family benefits. We study here empirically the link between fertility and financial incentives by estimating and simulating a joint structural model of participation and fertility on a sample of French...

The purpose of this paper is to study the causes of unemployment empirically, using individual data and an approach which refines that of Meyer and Wise. Using the French 1997 Labour Survey data, we decompose non-employment of married women into three components: voluntary, classical (due to the...