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Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency
Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more disclosure to maximize profitability when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656269
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China
Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liao, Guanmin; Yu, Xiaoyun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firms in emerging markets. To establish causality, we use a unique dataset from China and exploit that at different times, Chinese provinces introduced policies to attract highly talented emigrants. These policies led to an exogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084604
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund … post-disclosure and show that disclosure is not a panacea: for some proposals disclosure hurts activism. The desirability … of disclosure also depends on the distribution of business ties amongst mutual funds. We provide support for existing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841
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Large powerful shareholders and cash holding
Anderson, Ronald W.; Hamadi, Malika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We study the relationship between liquid asset holding and the pattern of share ownership and control structures within the firm. We explore these issues using a data set of Belgian firms that is particularly well suited to studying the institutions of control oriented finance. The data include...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005041096
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Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240
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Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717
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The Internal Governance of Firms
Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. We find that internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure firms have substantial value, even without any external governance. Internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207