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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790

Coordination, Cooperation, Contagion and Currency Crises

Loisel, Olivier; Martin, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We analyse the effect of trade spillovers and of international coordination on currency crises. To do this, we present … a model that builds on two separate literatures: the literature on international monetary cooperation on the one hand … and the larger the set of multiple equilibria. Coordination decreases the possibility of simultaneous self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124321

Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence From a Natural Voting Experiment

Bütler, Monika; Maréchal, Michel André - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper analyzes a recent ballot in which two virtually identical popular initiatives, both demanding a decrease in the legal age of retirement in Switzerland, led to differences in approval rates of nearly seven percentage points. Based on this unique natural experiment, the existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504768

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to … exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that democratic participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With … endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work

den Berg, Gerard J van; van der Klaauw, Bas; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661560

The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661888

Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks

Goldstein, Itay; Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

affects its policy decision. We show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468601

Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real Investment

Goldstein, Itay; Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators … coordination among speculators and study policy measures that affect patterns of coordination to improve price informativeness and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530385

Should We Worry About the Fiscal Numerology of Maastricht?

Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

The paper reviews and evaluates in a non-technical manner the economic and political arguments for and against the two fiscal convergence criteria written into the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocols. In order to qualify for full membership in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), net general...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123517