from inherent biases such as over-optimism. Menus of contingent contracts that arise in principal-agent relationships are …We propose to view action-contingent contracts as bets, motivated by different prior beliefs between the contracting … offer his worker to choose between fixed-wage and profit-sharing schemes, in order to screen the worker's degree of optimism …

compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most …

relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize optimal relational contracts and competitive screening policies which are …We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with … interdependent. When non-contractible dimensions are important, the principal optimally restricts competitive screening to a subset …

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …

This Paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimism on financial contracting and corporate performance …. Optimism may increase effort, but is bad for adaptation decisions as the entrepreneur underweights negative information. The … first-best contract with an optimist uses contingencies to ‘bridge the gap in beliefs’. When only debt contracts are …

A principal contracts with agents who have diverse abilities to forecast changes in their future tastes. While the … contracts in order to screen the agent’s type. We provide a full characterization of the principal’s optimal menu. The results …

innovations. Our analysis provides a rationale for the use of contingencies (specifically, patent approval) in VC contracts …