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It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504573
We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468692
A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the problems with current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847
When an individual performs several tasks simultaneously, resources must be allocated to different brain systems to produce energy for neurons to fire. Following the evidence from neuroscience, we model the brain as an organization in which a coordinator allocates limited resources to the brain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493563
Should privately informed agents with diverging interests act independently or should they commit to a mechanism? This paper analyzes different communication and decision protocols when communication involves delay. It studies under which conditions agents should (i) choose their actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498109
In this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123705
The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730
A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083881
People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing their experiences. In other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656406