entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay …A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing … predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers …

the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive …

The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth … economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external … rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium …

procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …

countries this chapter seeks to understand corruption through the lens of political economy -- particularly in terms of the … implications of this view of corruption for anti-corruption policies. …

enforcement of property rights influences the ex-post distribution of rents, there is room for corruption. We characterize the …) rents to government employees; ii) corruption; and iii) misallocation of talent. Therefore, these observations are not by … corruption and the misallocation of talent, and increase investment. It will also often be the case that bureaucracies will …

) an equilibrium with corruption discourages firms to invest, (ii) firms bribe if the level of development is low, but (iii … can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium forever? Corruption and lobbying are to some extent substitutes. By …) they switch to lobbying if the level of development is sufficiently high. Combined, the economy might evolve from a bribing …