We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions … and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable sub-networks inhibit more valuable larger … networks. The model provides formal definitions for individual and communities’ ‘social capital’ in the spirit of Coleman and …

groups in the UK. Our empirical findings suggest that, though personal networks are a popular method of finding a job for the … differences across ethnic groups with some groups losing out disproportionately from using personal networks. …

Survey (QLFS), we test these hypotheses. Our empirical findings are consistent with the theory since they suggest that …, though networks are a popular method of finding a job for the ethnic minorities, they are not necessarily the most effective … out disproportionately from using personal networks. …

bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of … that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a … battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of …

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature … associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one … suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in …

theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and … influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are …

can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium forever? Corruption and lobbying are to some extent substitutes. By … lobby the government to change the rules in more developed ones? Should we expect an evolution from bribing to lobbying, or …) an equilibrium with corruption discourages firms to invest, (ii) firms bribe if the level of development is low, but (iii …

provided, focusing on the transition from networks to hierarchies. Four general lessons are drawn: (1) developments in services …