Showing 1 - 10 of 189
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083745
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of … organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization …. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084010
This paper first discusses how the market is delineated in some recent antitrust cases in the printed media industry …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123955
conditional probability of eliciting an antitrust challenge (i.e., remedies and prohibitions) involves the strongest deterrence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225959
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973970
antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority’s decision, the influence activities … institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577815
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408
Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect … unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions – Prohibitions, Remedies … empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find merger prohibitions to lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791805