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Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

Procurement with specialized firms

Boone, Jan; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms in a setting where the procurement agency has incomplete information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009385768

Procuring Innovation

Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

, including ideas and research, from their strategic suppliers. A careful design of procurement policy is crucial to make … potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … consider a menu of procurement methods and policies for best procuring new knowledge and innovative products, discussing their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions

Cantillon, Estelle; Pesendorfer, Martin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

require cost synergies and can instead serve as a tool to leverage market power across the different routes. As a result, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791983

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795

When are Auctions Best?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123726

Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying mechanism, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer’s expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123964

Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?

Currie, David; Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

delegation in the context of a cost-reimbursement procurement problem. Our solution combines several features of the modern …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136782

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976