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Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
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More Insiders, More Insider Trading: Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts
Acharya, Viral V; Johnson, Tim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
. They are unlikely to be consistent with models of optimal regulation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498160
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Third Party Monitoring and Golden Parachutes
Iossa, Elisabetta; Legros, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
When today’s actions can affect tomorrow's value of an asset and when the principal does not have access to hard information, either about productive activity or monitoring activity, two incentive problems must be simultaneously solved: first, the ‘ex-ante’ moral hazard problem of inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504381
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A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773
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What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation
Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper reviews the theories of corruption in regulated sectors to further understand the impact of corruption and the ways in which it can be reduced. The aim is to draw out the policy implications of the different theoretical approaches and to examine the support that can be garnered for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683530
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Cognitive Ability and Paternalism
Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
sufficient intelligence by people with limited intelligence may dominate government regulation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662402
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Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information
Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We study a two-stage sequential search model with two agents who compete for one job. The agents arrive sequentially, each one in a different stage. The agents' abilities are private information and they are derived from heterogeneous distribution functions. In each stage the designer chooses an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276381
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Higher Vote Thresholds for Incumbents, Effort and Selection
Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025512
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Health Insurance without Single Crossing: why healthy people have high coverage
Boone, Jan; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Standard insurance models predict that people with high (health) risks have high insurance coverage. It is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured. We show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209831
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Time to Decide: Information Search and Revelation in Groups
Campbell, Arthur; Ederer, Florian; Spinnewijn, Johannes - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We analyze costly information acquisition and information revelation in groups in a dynamic setting. Even when group members have perfectly aligned interests the group may inefficiently delay decisions. When deadlines are far away, uninformed group members freeride on each others' efforts to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246605